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COMMENT
THE TUNNEY ACT: JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION
INTRODUCTION
In Bill Gates's book, The Road Ahead,' the lMficrosoft
chairman paints a rosy portrait of a world full of wallet-size
computers, digital cash and an online marketplace eliminating
the need for retail middlemen.2 He, of course, imagines him-
self at the helm of this digital revolution. Noteworthy in his
autobiography, however, is the absence of any mention of the
U.S. government's four-year antitrust investigation of
1ficrosoft, which was settled in 1995.'
1 BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD (1995).
2 Id
' Although the particular investigation discussed in this Comment was settled
in 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice's inquiry into Microsoft practices is ongo-
ing. In May 1995, Microsofts intended $2 billion acquisition of Intuit Inc., maker
of Quicken personal finance software, was abandoned when the Justice Department
threatened to contest the deal. Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft Halts Merger with
Intuit; Prospect of Lengthy Antitrust Trial Is Key, WASH. POST, May 21, 1995, at
Al. More recently, Netscape Communications Inc., MicrosoWs major rival in the
market for Internet software, encouraged the Justice Department to look into
Microsoft's marketing practices. Netscape claimed that Microsoft was using its
dominance in operating systems to influence computer manufacturers and Internet
service providers into using Microsoft's browser software instead of Netscape's.
Netscape accused Microsoft of offering financial incentives, such as discounts on its
operating system, in exchange for ensuring that Netscape's Internet browser is
made less accessible to users. Microsoft has claimed that the-e accusations are
untrue and are a public relations ploy to divert attention away from the quality of
Microsoft technology. David S. Hilzearath & Elizabeth Corcoran, Justice Renews
Antitrust Scrutiny of Microsoft; Marketing of Internet Software Is Questioned,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1996, at Fl.
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Microsoft, the world's largest developer of computer soft-
ware,4 had been charged with violating Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.5 After a three-year Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") investigation into Microsoft's practices ended in a 2-2
deadlock over whether to file suit, the Justice Department
began its own investigation of Microsoft.6 As a result of this
inquiry, Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman, head of
the Antitrust Division,7 initiated settlement negotiations with
Microsoft in June 1994. A consent decree was filed simulta-
neously with a formal complaint brought by the Justice De-
partment on July 15, 1994. In the consent decree, Microsoft
agreed to alter those contracts with personal computer manu-
facturers that were allegedly preventing competitors from pro-
moting their own operating system software.8
' It is estimated that Microsoft controls about 85% of the operating system
market. Viveca Novak & Don Clark, Microsoft Antitrust Pact Rejected by Federal
Judge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1995, at A3.
6 Complaint, United States v. Microsoft, 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.) (No. 94-1564)
[hereinafter Microsoft 1] (denying entry of consent decree), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), as amended by Act of
Nov. 16, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 2880, reads as follows:
Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
Section 2 states:
Monopolizing trade, a felony; penalty:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
6 Henry J. Reske, Judge Takes Lead Role in Microsoft Case: In a Controversial
Ruling, Sporkin Rejects Antitrust Consent Decree, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 36.
' Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman, who was appointed by President
Clinton in 1993 to head the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, retired from
the agency on October 18, 1996. Joel Klein, Ms. Bingaman's principal deputy, was
designated her successor. Sidebar: News of the Profession, 19 NAT'L L.J. 8, Oct, 21,
1996, at A5.
' Proposed Consent Decree, Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.) (No. 94-1564),
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Judge Stanley Sporkin of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia may have provided the only exciting mo-
ment for Bill Gates in the entire investigation.' In an excep-
tional ruling which stunned both Microsoft and the Justice De-
partment, Judge Sporkin rejected the proposed consent de-
cree.'0 Specifically, he objected to the lack of information giv-
en to the court regarding the consent decree, the narrowness of
the decree's scope, the fact that the parties were unwilling to
address certain anticompetitive practices, and what he per-
ceived to be the ineffectiveness of the decree's enforcement
and compliance mechanisms. 1
In refusing to approve the decree, Judge Sporkin clashed
with the Justice Department regarding the appropriate
amount of discretion he had to review the settlement under the
1974 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the Tunney Act, which requires courts to deter-
mine whether a consent decree in an antitrust case is "in the
public interest."2 In determining the scope of his review,
Judge Sporkin pointed to the language of the Tunney Act, its
legislative history, case law and "common sense."" He con-
cluded that Congress passed the Tunney Act because it was
concerned about the secrecy of corporate dealings with the
government. 4 Congress, therefore, had envisioned an inde-
pendent role for the courts in reviewing antitrust consent de-
crees.'5 Judge Sporkin justified his decision by claiming that
courts were not to serve as mere "rubber stamps" in the pro-
ceedings."
rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Judge Sporkin has acquired a reputation for controversy, both as a district
court judge and as an enforcement lawyer at the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion. For background information on Judge Sporkin, see Saundra Torry & Eliz-
abeth Corcoran, Sporkin: Overruled, But Undeterred, Microsoft Case Typifies the
Judge's Blunt Activism, WASH. POST, July 23, 1995, at BI.
"0 See Viveca Novak & Don Clark, Microsoft Pact Rejected by Federal Judge,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1995, at A3.
" Reske, supra note 6.
,2 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994) Ihere-
inafter Tunney Act].
11 Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 330-32.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id-
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Both the Justice Department and Microsoft quickly ap-
pealed Judge Sporkin's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.17 The Justice Department
claimed that Judge Sporkin's broad reading of the Tunney Act
radically altered the permissible scope of judicial review under
the law and threatened the ongoing enforcement program of
the Antitrust Division, which relies heavily upon settlements
based on consent decrees. 8 Four months later, the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the consent agreement and ruled that a court can-
not second-guess the government's investigative process unless
there has been a "strong showing" of bad faith or improper con-
duct. 9 The case was then transferred to another judge who
approved the decree.20
This Comment examines Judge Sporkin's reliance on the
Tunney Act in rejecting the Microsoft consent decree. Specifi-
cally, this Comment analyzes whether the language of the
statute, case law and legislative history support Judge
Sporkin's expansive view of the judiciary's role in reviewing
such decrees in antitrust cases. Part I sets forth the provisions
contained in the Tunney Act for settling antitrust cases. Part
II provides a background of the personal computer industry, as
well as an account of the history of the Microsoft litigation.
Part III outlines Judge Sporkin's reasons for rejecting the con-
sent decree and the bases for the appeals brought by the Jus-
tice Department and Microsoft. Part IV analyzes Judge
Sporkin's reasoning in rejecting the decree. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that Judge Sporkin's expansive view of judi-
cial discretion in reviewing consent decrees under the Tunney
Act was both an accurate expression of congressional intent
and a necessary instrument for the promotion of the public
welfare in antitrust cases.
1 Microsoft's Motion for Expedited Consideration and for Briefing Schedule,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1564)
[hereinafter Microsoft I]; Justice Department's Motion for Expedited Consider-
ation and for Briefing Schedule, Microsoft II, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No.
94-1564).
" Justice Department's Motion for Expedited Consideration and for Briefing
Schedule at 1, Microsoft II, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1564).
'9 Microsoft II, 56 F.3d at 1449.
20 United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A. 94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 at *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Microsoft II1].
1296 [Vol. 62: 1293
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I. THE TUNNEY ACT
The Tunney Act, passed by Congress in 1974 amid public
concern about the secrecy of antitrust settlements, contains a
number of provisions designed to address consent decrees in
antitrust cases." Any proposed settlement must be accompa-
nied by a "competitive impact statement" which describes the
agreement and its predicted effects on competition.' The com-
petitive impact statement must also contain: (1) the reasons for
the complaint and the alleged antitrust violations; (2) the rem-
edies available to private claimants if the decree is entered;
and (3) a description and evaluation of any alternatives to the
settlement that the Justice Department considered.' Both the
proposed consent decree and the competitive impact statement
must be filed with the district court and published in the Fed-
eral Register at least sixty days prior to the effective date of
the decree.' A summary of the agreement, the competitive
impact statement, and other materials related to the investiga-
tion must be published in newspapers of general circulation at
least sixty days before the effective date of the decree.' Dur-
ing this sixty-day period, the public may submit written com-
ments relating to the proposal, and the Justice Department
must file responses to such comments with the Federal Regis-
ter and the district court.2"
Subsections (e) and (M of the Tunney Act are central to the
dispute between the Justice Department and Judge SporkinY
21 Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994); see infra Section IV.B for a discus-
sion of the legislative history behind the Tunney Act.
' Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
231&
24 Id.
' Id. § 16(c).
26 Id. § 16(d).
Specifically, § 16(e)-(f) of the Tunney Act reads as follow:
(e) Before entering any consent judgment by the United States under this
section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in
the public interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court may
consider-
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration
or relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually con-
sidered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such
judgment,
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and
1297
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Subsection (e) provides that at the close of the public comment
period, and before entering the consent decree, the district
court must determine whether the approval of the proposed
settlement is "in the public interest."28 The Act does not de-
fine "public interest"; however, it lists a number of factors that
the court may consider in making its determination.29 The
first group of factors, listed in subsection (e), includes the gen-
eral competitive effects that such a settlement would have on
both individuals claiming specific injury and the public at
large.0 The court may also consider the provisions for en-
forcement, the anticipated effects of alternative remedies the
Justice Department actually considered and "any other consid-
erations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment."3
In subsection (f), the Tunney Act authorizes the court at its
discretion to consider a number of specific factors in making its
public interest determination.12 The court may hear the testi-
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the
complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be de-
rived from a determination of the issues at trial.
(M Procedure for public interest determination
In making its determination under subsection (e) of this section, the
court may-
(1) take testimony of Government officials or experts or such other expert
witnesses, upon motion of any party or participant or upon its own mo-
tion, as the court may deem appropriate;
(2) appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert wit-
nesses as the court may deem appropriate; and request and obtain the
views, evaluations, or advice of any individual, group or agency of gov-
ernment with respect to any aspects of the proposed judgment or the
effect of such judgment, in such manner as the court deems appropriate;
(3) authorize full or limited participation in proceedings before the court
by interested persons or agencies, including appearance amicus curiae,
intervention as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
examination of witnesses or documentary materials, or participation in
any other manner and extent which serves the public interest as the
court may deem appropriate;
(4) review any comments including any objections filed with the United
States under subsection (d) of this section concerning the proposed judg-
ment and the responses of the United States to such comments and
objections; and
(5) take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem
appropriate.
28 Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
Id. § 16(e)-().
20 Id. § 16(e).
31 Id.
32 Id. § 16(f).
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mony of government officials or expert witnesses, appoint a
special master or other outside consultants, authorize interven-
tion or amici curiae, and review any comments or objections to
the proposed settlement.s Finally, the statute provides that
the court may "take such other action in the public interest as
the court may deem appropriate. " '
H. HISTORY OF THE CASE AGAINST MICROSOFT
A. Industry Background
In order to comprehend the necessity for expansive judicial
review of the Microsoft consent decree, it is important to un-
derstand the complexity of the computer industry and the
investigation of Microsoft. The unique interdependence of com-
puter technology has been one of the most significant factors in
the investigation of Microsoft's practices. This interrelatedness,
which leads toward natural monopoly, makes antitrust over-
sight of the computer industry particularly essential and com-
plex because, given the inherent tendency toward cohesion, the
government must be especially cautious to prevent a market
leader such as Microsoft from erecting artificial barriers that
extend its naturally derived monopoly.'
To function properly, every computer must have a micro-
processor, or chip, which is the "brain" of the computer. In
addition, the computer must have an operating system that
permits the computer to integrate its component parts to oper-
ate smoothly together.37 Computers are usually sold with the
microprocessor in place and the operating system installed.
Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(M.
I4 d. § 16(f)(5). The Tunney Act does not require the court to consider the pro-
posed settlement only in terms of antitrust law. The court may also contemplate
"non-substantive reasons inherent in the process of settling cases throughout the
consent decree procedure." Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Dzcrees
Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MICH. L. REV. 153,
157 (1983) thereinafter Scope of Judicial Review] (quoting 1973 IHR. REP. No.
1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 US.C.C.A.N. 6542).
"s See Joel Klein & Preeta Bansal, International Antitrust Enforcement in the
Computer Industry, 41 VILL. L. REv. 173 (1996).
11 Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquible, The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat, 40
ANTrrRusT BULL. 257, 258 (1995).
Id.
1299
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Application software is then added, permitting the computer to
perform specific tasks.8 Application software must be compat-
ible with the installed operating system in order to function.
This requirement has shaped the growth of the personal com-
puter industry and the investigation of Microsoft. 3 9
Microsoft sells both operating systems (MS-DOS, Windows
95 and NT) and application software for personal computers
("PCs"). Application software includes word processing pro-
grams, spreadsheets, databases and other programs that allow
users to complete tasks with their PCs.4 The operating sys-
tem is the device that controls the application software. In
turn, the application software controls hardware devices and
performs functions such as reading and writing files on a
disk.4
1
Microsoft owes much of its success to another leader in the
PC market, International Business Machines ("IBM"). Prior to
the 1980s, IBM dominated the market in mainframe comput-
ers. However, it did not expect the dramatic demand for PCs
that developed in the 1980s. When IBM began developing its
PC, it selected Intel Corporation to supply 808 microprocessors
and Microsoft to supply computer languages.4 1 IBM also need-
ed an operating system for its new PC. It looked to the then-
dominant CP/M operating system from its developer, Digital
Research, Inc. ("DRI"). However, that deal fell through, and
Microsoft was asked to step in. Microsoft acquired the rights to
a clone of the CP/M operating system called QDOS, which it
modified and licensed to IBM as MS-DOS. Fortunately for
Microsoft, the deal with IBM was not exclusive, and Microsoft
began licensing its operating system to manufacturers who had
38 Id.
, Id. This interdependence, which is often referred to as "network
externalities," provides that an operating system with a large installed base has
certain self-reinforcing qualities. First, independent software vendors are more
likely to write application programs for operating systems with a large installed
base. Additionally, an operating system with a large installed base is more likely
to attract consumers because it means that many others will use the same or sim-
ilar products, permitting the consumer to exchange work products with peers suc-
cessfully. Klein & Bansal, supra note 35, at 177.
' John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network
Externalities; Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision
Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317, 321 (1995).
41 Id.
42 Blair & Esquible, supra note 36, at 259.
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cloned the IBM PC. The IBM PC became the standard for the
entire industry, resulting in an enormous market of lower-
priced clones of the IBM PC, each containing a Microsoft oper-
ating system.43 Microsoft's operating system, "having caught
a ride with IBM... became nearly the entire market.""
IBM and DRI continued to develop their own operating
systems, despite the selection of MS-DOS for IBM's PC. IBM
began selling its own version of MS-DOS, called PC-DOS,
which it marketed with its computers. Microsoft and IBM also
teamed up to develop OS/2, an alternative operating system.
After a dissolution of the partnership between IBM and
Microsoft in 1992, IBM continued its development of OS/2,
while Microsoft focused its attention on Windows. Since then,
IBM has introduced a major upgrade, called OS/2 Warp, which
it is touting as an alternative to Windows.'
DRI modified its own operating system, which sold some-
what successfully as DR-DOS. Version 5.0 of DR-DOS man-
aged to acquire ten percent of all operating system sales in
1990. Shortly after the introduction of DR-DOS, Microsoft
made announcements that its upgrade of MS-DOS, version 5.0,
would approximate all the advantages of DR-DOS.46 It took a
year, however, before version 5.0 was available. Simulta-
neously, Microsoft began selling its 3.0 version of Windows,
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 322.
Blair & Esquible, supra note 36, at 259. The MS-DOS system, because of
memory limitations, is controlled by textual commands that the user must type.
Microsoft Windows, developed later in the 1980s, addressed this limitation by
adding a graphical user interface (GU) and the ability to run more than one
application at a time ("multitasking7). Wimdows allows MS-DOS to mimic Apple
Computer's use of the mouse, on-screen icons and menus for executing commands.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 322.
1 Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 322. Although IBM's 0S2 operating
system is widely perceived to be a "sinking ship," it has developed a small, but
loyal following. For example, "EurOSI2* is a forum dedicated, by its own accounts,
to providing "mutual support7 between users of 0S12 who subscribe to the policy
of "ABM," an acronym for "anything but Microsoft." At a November 1996 meeting
of EurOS/2, the guest speaker was none other than Graham Lea, editor of the
newsletter Microsoft Monitor and a man who has dedicated his life to
"Illuminat[ing] Microsoft's nefarious practices." See Embattled OS12 Users Find
Mutual Support in Pitying, Rather Than Fearing Microsoft Corp., COMPLF, RGRAM
iNT'L, Nov. 4, 1996 [hereinafter Embattled OS12 Users].
"' Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 323; sec Kenneth C. Baseman et al.,
Microsoft Plays Hardbalk The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Tcchnical Incom-
patibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Marlets for Operating System Software,
40 ANTITRUST BULL. 265 (1995).
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followed by Windows 3.1. Shortly thereafter, DR-DOS sales
began to falter, and DRI subsequently removed DR-DOS from
the market, leaving Microsoft with an even greater market
share."
B. The Federal Trade Commission Investigation
In June 1990, the FTC began investigating Microsoft,
focusing on allegations that Microsoft had used predatory prac-
tices to bring about the failure of DR-DOS and to extend its
operating system monopoly into application software. These
predatory practices included "vaporware"-misleading product
announcements which discourage competition-and technical
sabotage that made DR-DOS appear to be incompatible with
Windows. The FTC also examined Microsoft's per processor li-
censing agreements with original equipment manufacturers
("OEMs") who preinstall operating systems in their products
before selling to consumers. Per processor licenses require
these OEMs to pay a license fee for each microprocessor that
they sell, regardless of whether it is installed with a Microsoft
operating system.48
The FTC investigation focused on similar practices by
Microsoft regarding its application software, revealing a num-
ber of troubling practices.49 First, Microsoft allegedly intended
to make its application software more compatible than other
independent software vendors ("ISVs") with Microsoft operat-
ing systems. Second, Microsoft purportedly sought to use its
control over operating systems to prevent the introduction of
application software upgrades by these ISVs.50 Third,
Microsoft allegedly encouraged competitors to continue devel-
oping OS/2 software, knowing that Microsoft was planning a
full-scale promotion of its Windows operating system in the
near future.51 This practice gave Microsoft a head start on de-
veloping application software compatible with its Windows
operating system. Finally, there were allegations that
'7 Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 323.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 323.
" Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 323.
o Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 324.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 324; see Stuart Taylor, Jr., What to Do
with the Microsoft Monster, AM. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 72.
1302 [Vol. 62: 1293
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Microsoft's operating system division provided confidential
information to its application software division about ISVs.
This information was obtained while Microsofts operating
system division was supposed to be investigating problems
with the ISVs product's compatibility. 2 The result of these
practices was that any system installed with either the MS-
DOS or Windows operating system was virtually tied to
Microsoft application software.'
In February 1993, the FTC deadlocked on its Bureau of
Competition's recommendation to bring an action against
Microsoft.' A second vote in July again resulted in a dead-
lock,' and the FTC decided to end its investigation.'
C. The Justice Department's Case Against Microsoft
In August 1993, the Justice Department initiated its own
extensive investigation of Microsoft.57 The Justice Department
issued twenty-one civil investigative demajids ' to Microsoft
and third parties, interviewed more than one hundred people,
and deposed twenty-two individuals. The investigation con-
sumed 14,000 attorney hours, 5500 paralegal hours and 3650
economist hours."9
On July 15, 1994, the Justice Department filed a com-
plaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
alleging that Microsoft had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.' The complaint alleged that Microsoft had mo-
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 323.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 40, at 324.
James Coates, Microsoft Avoids FTC Charges, But Case Remains Open, CHI.
TRIB., July 22, 1993, at 1.
"Id
Id. The FTC declined to comment on the deadlock. On July 21, 1993, the
Commission adjourned its closed meeting regarding Microsoft without making a
public announcement, which it generally makes when a complaint is issued. The
decision to bring a complaint is usually voted on by five members. In the case of
Microsoft, however, one member, Roscoe Starek I, removed himself from the vote
because his family owns computer stock. FTC Reportedly Deadlocks Again in Vote
on Antitrust Action Against Aficrosoft, COURIER J., July 22, 1993, at 3D.
'7 David Bender, The Microsoft Antitrust Wars, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTITRUST. 1995, at 321 (PLI Patents, Copyrights & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3942, 1995).
11 A civil investigative demand ("CID") is a general discovery subpoena autho-
rized under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
5' Bender, supra note 57, at 321.
Complaint SS 42, 44, Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 94-
1303
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nopoly power in the PC operating system market because, for
almost a decade, Microsoft had retained a market share consis-
tently in excess of seventy percent.6' In addition to the natu-
ral barriers frustrating entry into the market, the Justice De-
partment found that Microsoft had entered into "a series of
exclusionary and anticompetitive contract terms to maintain
its monopoly."
2
The complaint also made a number of specific allegations
regarding Microsoft's contracts with OEMs. First, Microsoft's
exclusionary and anticompetitive OEM licenses foreclosed ac-
cess to the OEM channel by competitors of Microsoft's PC
operating system. Second, Microsoft's licenses imposed an un-
warranted penalty or tax by requiring payment to Microsoft
even if the OEM installed a non-Microsoft operating system.
Third, the contract length of Microsoft's anticompetitive per
processor contracts magnified its exclusionary effects, and
Microsoft's exclusionary contracts foreclosed other PC operat-
ing system vendors from a substantial and critically important
segment of the market. Finally, the Justice Department al-
leged that Microsoft maintained anticompetitive nondisclosure
agreements that restricted ISVs from working with competing
PC operating system developers to create competitive prod-
ucts.
6 3
The purported anticompetitive effects of Microsoft's con-
duct were set forth in the complaint as well.6 The govern-
ment alleged that Microsoft's exclusionary practices had the
effect of excluding competitors on a basis other than competi-
tion on the merits.65 This allowed Microsoft to perpetuate ille-
gally its monopoly in the PC operating system market.66
1564), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
" Id. T 15. Monopoly power, by itself, is not illegal. For a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act, the monopolist must have purposefully exercised its monopoly
power to acquire or maintain its market. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United
States, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
"2 Complaint 19, Microsoft I (No. 94-1564).
3 Id. 'I 29.
Id. %% 35-38.
6, Id. 91 35.
"' Id. OEMs that do not offer customers a choice of operating systems may
charge customers a higher price for PCs with non-Microsoft operating systems in
order to be able to pay the double royalty necessitated by the Microsoft per pro-
cessor agreements. Thus, users who do not receive a Microsoft system are still,
indirectly, paying Microsoft. Id. 91 37.
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Moreover, not only did Microsoft's unlawful conduct harm
consumers directly, its practices also deterred the development
of competing operating systems, thereby depriving consumers
of a choice of systems with possibly superior features.'
Microsoft and the Justice Department filed a proposed
consent decree simultaneously with the Justice Department's
formal complaint." The consent decree precluded Microsoft
from a number of practices. Microsoft was prohibited from: (1)
entering into any license agreement for a Microsoft operating
systems' with a duration of more than one year; (2) requiring
OEMs to purchase a minimum number of Microsoft operating
systems; (3) requiring OEMs to purchase other Microsoft prod-
ucts as a condition of licensing Microsoft operating systems; (4)
entering into any license agreement that restricted an OEM
from licensing, selling or distributing any non-Microsoft operat-
ing system product; and (5) entering into any licensing agree-
ment that required an OEM to pay a royalty for each PC sold,
regardless of the type of microprocessor used. Finally, with a
few exceptions, Microsoft was prevented from entering into any
licensing agreement other than one in which royalties were
based on the number of copies of each Microsoft operating
system sold.7"
According to the decree, any OEM whose current licensing
agreement with Microsoft was inconsistent with the consent
decree could either terminate the licensing agreement or ne-
- Complaint 38, Mirosoft I (No. 94-1564).
Proposed Consent Decree, United States v. M4icrosoft, 159 FI.RD. 318
(D.D.C.) (No. 94-1564), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In addition to execut-
ing the proposed settlement with the U.S. Justice Department, Microsoft simulta-
neously agreed to a settlement with the European Community Commision. This
followed a complaint filed with the EC Commission by Novell, the world's second
largest PC software company. The EC Commission, like the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment, was concerned about Microsoft's use of per processor licenses and the du-
ration of icrosoft license agreements. Microsoft agreed to the exchange of infor-
mation between the Justice Department and the EC Commission, which resulted
in a settlement with the EC Commission that was very similar to Microsofts
settlement with the United States. Bender, supra note 57, at 322.
1 The consent decree expressly excluded Windows NT, which doe not possess
a substantial market share. Deborah A. Garza, The Court of Appeals Sets Strict
Limits on Tunney Act Review: The Microsoft Consent Decree, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995,
at 21-22.
1o However, the licensee may have the option to renew for a second year.
Proposed Consent Decree, Microsoft I (No. 94-1564).
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gotiate with Microsoft to modify it."' Further, within thirty
days of the entry of the consent decree, Microsoft was required
to provide a copy of the consent decree to all OEMs with whom
it had licensing agreements.72 Absent from the consent decree
was any reference to Microsoft's alleged "vaporware" practices
whereby Microsoft preannounced products in order to discour-
age competition from other software developers.
In the stipulation accompanying the proposed consent
decree, Microsoft agreed to be bound by the decree unless the
government withdrew its approval of the decree.73 The final
step in the settlement process was to be the Tunney Act pro-
ceeding. Prior to this case, formal judicial approval of an anti-
trust settlement generally had been pro forma. 4
III. JUDGE SPORKIN's REJECTION OF THE CONSENT DECREE
A. The Tunney Act Hearing
On January 20, 1995, a hearing was held pursuant to the
Tunney Act to consider the proposed consent decree. The pro-
ceeding generated an unusual amount of public interest." In
addition to the Justice Department and Microsoft, a number of
representatives from the computer industry were present.76
Assistant Attorney General Bingaman began the proceeding by
stating that the role of the court was to determine whether the
consent decree was "within the reaches of the public interest."
71 Id.
72 Id.
" Bender, supra note 57, at 319 (quoting Stipulation Accompanying Proposed
Consent Decree, Microsoft I (No. 94-1564)).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec., 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
United States v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. National
Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
"' The Justice Department's settlement with Microsoft was much weaker than
many had hoped. Many of Microsoft's application software competitors had hoped
that Microsoft would be forced to build a "wall" between its operating system and
its application software. Some had even hoped for a forced breakup of the com-
puter giant. Garza, supra note 69, at 22.
"' Representatives appeared on behalf of the Computer and Communications
Industry Association ("CCIA"), I.D.E. Corporation ("IDEA"), and three anonymous
companies. Although he allowed them to participate in the proceedings, Judge
Sporkin denied the motions of IDEA and CCIA to intervene. Microsoft I, 159
F.R.D. at 328.
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B. Judge Sporkin's Opinion and Order
On February 14, 1995, Judge Sporkin surprised both
Microsoft and the Justice Department when he handed down
his opinion and order denying the motion to enter the proposed
consent decree. He complained that the proposed decree was
"significantly and substantially narrower than the requests
contained in the prayer for relief in the complaint,"' and that
there was a "severe lack of information regarding the proposed
consent decree," noting that only five public comments were
filed during the public comment period provided by the Tunney
Act.78 He was also displeased that neither the Justice Depart-
ment nor Microsoft had supplied any information regarding
how the consent decree was formulated, stating that "[i]f a
Court is asked to approve a decree without information regard-ing the effect of the decree, then the Court's role becomes a
nullity, exactly what the Tunney Act sought to prevent.";9 Be-
cause of the lack of information provided by both the Justice
Department and Microsoft, Judge Sporkin decided to invoke
the procedures provided by the Tunney Act, including permit-
ting the appearance of amici curiae.
Judge Sporkin then addressed the scope of his authority
regarding the public interest determination. Contrary to what
the Justice Department and Microsoft argued, Judge Sporkin
viewed his role in the determination as expansive, arguing
that the language of the statute, the legislative history, prece-
dent and common sense supported his position.'
Asserting what he viewed to be his authority under the
Tunney Act, Judge Sporkin did not find the proposed consent
decree to be in the public interest for four reasons!' First, the
government refused to supply the court with certain informa-
tion that it deemed necessary in making its public interest de-
termination. As Judge Sporkin noted: "Basically, other than
being told the Government spent a great deal of time on a wide
Id. at 324.
7' Id. at 326.
79 Id. at 327.
"Id. at 330. "It would be an abdication of the Courts responsibility, as man-
dated by Congress, not to conduct a thorough review of this proposed decree." Id.
at 329.
" Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 332.
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ranging inquiry and that the defendant is a tough bargainer,
the Court has not been provided with the essential information
it needs to make its public interest finding.""2 Second, the
scope of the decree was too narrow.' In particular, Judge
Sporkin was critical of the fact that the settlement applied
only to Windows and MS-DOS and not to operating systems
that might later be developed by Microsoft. He noted, "Given
the pace of technological change, the decree must anticipate
covering operating systems developed for new microprocessors.
In addition, taking into account Microsoft's penchant for nar-
rowly defining the antitrust laws, the Court fears there may be
endless debate as to whether a new operating system is cov-
ered by the decree. " " Third, the parties were unwilling to ad-
dress certain anticompetitive practices in which Microsoft had
allegedly engaged.' Finally, Judge Sporkin was not satisfied
that the enforcement and compliance mechanisms in the de-
cree were sufficient.86
Both Microsoft and the Justice Department submitted
appeals to Judge Sporkin's rejection of the proposed consent
decree.8 These appeals are discussed in turn below.
C. The Justice Department Appeals
In its appeal, the Justice Department argued that Judge
Sporkin had "misconstrued the permissible scope of his review
under the Tunney Act"' and that his decision, "unprecedent-
ed in the history of the Tunney Act, radically alters the nature
82 Id. In a typically colorful line, Judge Sporkin added, "Tunney Act courts are
not mushrooms to be placed in a dark corner and fertilized." Id. at 333.
6' Id. at 333.
84 Id.
' Id. The court was concerned about the allegations of vaporware, Microsoft's
use of its monopoly in the operating systems market to give it an advantage in
the application market, and its use of technical sabotage to render competitor's
application software incompatible with Microsoft operating systems.
" Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 333. Judge Sporkin was not convinced that the
settlement would open the market, which has large entry barriers. See supra note
39.
8 See David Bender, Microsoft and the Antitrust Wars, in COMPUTER SOFTWARE
AND THE INTERNET, at 39 (PLI Patents, Copyrights & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G4-2953, 1995).
" Motion for Expedited Consideration and for Briefing Schedule, Microsoft I
(94-1564).
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of Tunney Act review... [and] threatens the ongoing enforce-
ment of the Antitrust Division."' The Justice Department
claimed that Judge Sporkin had transformed the Tunney Act
into a "blueprint" for judicial prosecution of antitrust cases.'
According to the Justice Department, Judge Sporkin commit-
ted three fundamental errors in reaching his decision. First, he
erroneously concluded that the Tunney Act permits a court to
review the history of the government's investigation, including
its decision not to challenge certain practices, and its intention
to challenge other conduct in the future. The Justice Depart-
ment argued that "[tihe Tunney Act, however, never was in-
tended to substitute the court's views of what case to bring for
the government's."9' Second, the court erred in failing to lim-
it its consideration of the effects of the decree to the specific
allegations made in the complaint.' Third, Judge Sporkin
failed to defer to the judgment and expertise of the Justice De-
partment, as the contended he was required to do.' Finally,
the Justice Department argued that the rejection of the con-
sent decree, if uncorrected, would deter future antitrust parties
from entering into consent judgments, resulting in effects "po-
tentially devastating to efficient enforcement of the
law...."9
D. Microsoft Appeals
Microsoft's criticism of Judge Sporkin's decision was
somewhat stronger than that of the Justice Department.'
Microsoft explicitly appealed on a separation of powers princi-
ple, claiming that as a matter of constitutional law the court
was required to rely on the expertise of the Justice Depart-
ment in making its public interest determination.! Microsoft
"Id.
"Id.SId.
' Motion for Expedited Consideration and for Briefing Schedule, Microsoft I
(94-1564).
"Id.
" Bender, supra note 57, at 350 (citing Microsofts Brief on Appeal, Microsoft
H, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5039)).
"Bender, supra note 57, at 350 (citing Microsofes Brief on Appeal, Microsoft
H, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5039)).
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argued that if the Tunney Act was intended to be used in the
manner Judge Sporkin suggested, it would be an uncon-
stitutional grant of prosecutorial discretion to the judiciary. 7
Microsoft also alleged a number of serious procedural
errors, one of which was Judge Sporkin's alleged reliance on
Hard Drive," a book about Bill Gates and Microsoft."9
Microsoft claimed that the book was "riddled with factual inac-
curacies, which Microsoft [had] no real opportunity to re-
but."'0 Microsoft argued that Judge Sporkin should be dis-
qualified for his decision to gather facts outside the record and
for forming an adverse opinion based on these extrajudicial
sources.1
°1
E. The Appeals are Granted and the Consent Decree Approved
On April 24, 1995, the parties argued their appeals before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Judge Laurence Silberman wrote the opinion for the court,
rejecting Judge Sporkin's reasoning and remanding the case
with instructions that it be assigned to another district court
judge.0 2 Specifically, Judge Silberman ruled that a federal
' Bender, supra note 57, at 350 (citing Microsoft's Brief on Appeal, Microsoft
H, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5039)).
18 JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAK-
ING OF THE MICROsoFT EMPIRE (1994).
" Bender, supra note 57, at 351 (citing Microsoft's Brief on Appeal, Microsoft
II, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5039)).
10 Bender, supra note 57, at 351 (quoting Microsoft's Brief on Appeal at 23,
Microsoft II, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5039)).
10' "It is apparent that to Judge Sporkin's mind, a book based largely on con-
versations with Microsoft's competitors and disgruntled former employees has
replaced the Complaint as the yardstick against which the sufficiency of the con-
sent decree was to be measured." Bender, supra note 57, at 351 (quoting
Microsoft's Brief on Appeal at 24, Microsoft I, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No.
95-5039)).
102 The appeals court was troubled by a number of Judge Sporkin's actions,
including his reliance on the book Hard Drive and his decision to allow three
companies to proceed anonymously against Microsoft. Because of these concerns,
the court took the unusual step of reassigning the case to a judge other than
Judge Sporkin. Microsoft II, 56 F.3d at 1463-65.
Some trial judges were surprised at Judge Sporkin's removal from the case.
Torry & Corcoran, supra note 9, at B1. One colleague of Judge Sporkin comment-
ed that the tone of the opinion seemed "unduly harsh" and that the ruling may
have reflected a build-up of tensions between appellate and trial judges in recent
years. Torry & Corcoran, supra note 9, at B1. Judge Sporkin himself objected to
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court is limited to determining only whether a proposed con-
sent decree in an antitrust case falls "'within the reaches of the
public interest.'"'0 3  Using this narrow standard, Judge
Silberman determined that the government cannot be com-
pelled to investigate further or bring claims it did not bring
originally.' Thus, absent a "strong showing" of bad faith or
improper behavior, a federal court is not free to second guess
the Justice Department's investigative process."5 The case
was transferred and the consent decree approved.'
the unusual move, stating that judges should have a right to defend themselves
when a party seeks their removal "We give more due process to the common
criminal than we do to a judge. That can't be right. .. . " Tory & Corcoran,
supra note 9, at B1.
1" Microsoft H, 56 F.3d at 1458 (quoting United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F.
Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)).
104 Id.
10" Id. at 1459 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
1"1 Microsoft III, No. CIV.A.94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995).
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson approved the consent decree in a brief decision.
His written analysis of the public interest determination consisted of a single
sentence concluding that "entry of this final judgment is in the public interest.! Id.
at *7.
After the consent decree was approved, Assistant Attorney General Bingaman
declared that the case "sends a powerful message' to those who violate antitrust
law. G. Pascal Zachary, A Winning Deak Microsoft Wdl Remain Dominant Despite
Pact in Antitrust Dispute, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1994, at Al. Public sentiment,
however, indicates that those claims may be "political hyperbole" and that the
Justice Department failed to attack some of Microsofts most successful
anticompetitive tactics. Id. One reason for this may have been the Justice
Department's reluctance to take on a company that has been a symbol of Ameri-
can technological superiority after years of being trounced by the Japanese in
many markets. Id
Microsoft's competitors and industry analysts were certainly disappointed with
the agreement. Id. Rick Sherlund, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, called the settle-
ment "a fairly hollow victory" for the government. Id. Gordon Eubanks, chief exec-
utive officer of Symantec Inc., a medium-size software company, added, 'It doesn't
seem like anything has changed at all.* I& And, perhaps most tellingly, V7llam
Neukom, Microsoft's general counsel, predicted that the decree would have 'no
material effect" on the company. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JUDGE SPORKIN'S DECISION
A. The Language of the Tunney Act
The plain language of the Tunney Act does not contain the
limitations contemplated by Judge Silberman, the Justice
Department and Microsoft. Instead, the language is broad, dis-
cretionary and supportive of Judge Sporkin's interpretation.
Before entering a consent decree, the court must determine
that the decree is "in the public interest.""7 Although the Act
does not define the term "public interest," it does broadly sug-
gest that the court may use, in making its public interest de-
termination, "any other considerations bearing upon the ade-
quacy of such judgment."0 8
Subsection (f) of the Tunney Act offers the court specific
recommendations for making the public interest inquiry. These
include, but are not limited to: (1) taking the testimony of
government officials or experts; (2) appointing special masters,
experts or consultants and requesting the views, evaluations or
advice of any person with respect to any aspect of the decree;
(3) authorizing third parties to participate in a full or limited
basis as intervenors, amici curiae, or in any other capacity the
court deems to be in the public interest; and (4) reviewing
public comments and the Justice Department's responses to
them. O9 Following each of these four recommendations is a
discretionary phrase, "or as the court may deem appropri-
ate."" ' Despite the clarity of this language, Congress reiter-
ates the message a final time in the concluding language of
subsection (f), which states: "[Tihe court may... take such
other action in the public interest as the court may deem ap-
propriate.""'
It is a basic canon of statutory interpretation that when
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it must be
given effect."' The theory behind this principle is that the
1"7 Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
103 Id.
1 Id. § 16(f).
110 Id.
. Id. § 16(f)(5).
112 HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 35-36 (1896); FRANCIS J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 38
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best way to determine the meaning of statutory language is to
examine the language of the statute itself " When the words
employed are straightforward, the statute needs no further in-
terpretation because it interprets itself."1 The Tunney Act is
one such example where the meaning behind the words is
evident and, thus, further explanation becomes superfluous.
Despite the clarity of the Tunney Acts language, Microsoft
and the Justice Department claimed that Judge Sporkin was
limited in his public interest determination to the allegations
specified in the complaint."' Under their reading of the Act,
Judge Sporkin was not permitted to consider whether other
Microsoft practices were detrimental to the public interest.
iMicrosoft and the Justice Department referred to the following
language in subsection (e) of the Tunney Act to support this
assertion: "[Tihe court may consider... the impact of entry of
such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleg-
ing specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit....""' Their
argument for reliance on a single phrase of the Act is a tenu-
ous one, however, for as the Supreme Court held in King v. St.
Vincent's Hospital," statutes are not intended to be read in
pieces. Their true meaning can only be deduced from reading
them as a whole."' An application of this basic principle of
(1953). There is one exception to this principle of statutory construction and that
is if the plain language of the statute would lead to 'patently absurd consequenc-
es," then it need not be given effect. United States v. Brown, 333 US. 18, 27
(1948); see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460-61
(1892) (the decision gives examples of such absurd results: a sheriff was prosecut-
ed for obstructing the mails even though he was executing a warrant to arrest the
mail carrier for murder;, a law against drawing blood in the streets was to be
applied against a physician who came to the aid of a man who had fallen ill in
the street).
11 MCCAFFREY, supra note 112, at 1; Robert J. Araujo, The Use of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SE1rON HALL
LEGIS. J. 57, 70 (1992).
114 MCCAFFREY, supra note 112, at 1.
" The Justice Department and Microsoft submitted separate briefs on appeal.
Justice Department's Brief on Appeal, Aficrosoft H (No. 95-5037); Microsoft's Brief
on Appeal, MicrosoftH (No. 95-5037).
116 Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (emphasis added).
M 502 U.S. 215 (1991).
" See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 US.
642 (1974). Tlhe key to the whole act approach is ... that all provisions and
other features of the enactment must be given force, and provisions must be inter-
preted so as not to derogate from the force of the other provisions and features of
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statutory interpretation necessitates a reading of the Tunney
Act in its entirety, including the language granting the court
broad discretionary power in its public interest determination.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the
Tunney Act reinforces the plain meaning of the Act and sup-
ports Judge Sporkin's position that Congress intended to give
the judiciary broad review powers.' The Tunney Act was
passed in the wake of public concern over secrecy in govern-
ment settlements with large corporations-it was intended to
prevent settlements which "take on the aspects of a
'sweetheart' agreement."' One such settlement in particular,
the ITT antitrust settlement, was crucial in sparking the legis-
lative reform effort that led to the passage of the Tunney
Act.'
2
'
ITT was already the nation's ninth largest company when
it attempted to acquire three major companies, Grinnell Corpo-
ration, Canteen Corporation and the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company. This attempted expansion was met by a government
antitrust challenge in 1969. The cases challenging the acquisi-
tions of Grinnell and Canteen were tried on the merits, and in
both cases the government lost.' After the second loss, but
prior to a third trial challenging the acquisition of Hartford,
the government reached a settlement with ITT. The settlement
permitted ITT to retain Hartford in exchange for divesting it-
self of several smaller subsidiaries.'2 When the settlement
was reached in 1971, only the proposed consent decree was
the whole statute." WIfLLAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILP P. FRICKEY, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIc POLICY 644
(2d ed. 1995).
"' It is a basic principle of statutory construction that the object of all interpre-
tation of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature. See
BLACK, supra note 112, at 35; MCCAFFREY, supra note 112, at 1. For a review of
how legislative history is used to clarify statutes, see Araujo, supra note 113.
120 119 CONG. REC. HR28,156 (1973).
121 Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree
Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 603 (1973) [hereinafter 17T Dividend].
122 Id.
Id. at 603-04.
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made public, which was the general practice at that time. The
details of the negotiation process and the reasons for the gov-
ernment's decision were not revealed.'
The reasons for the settlement, however, became public
the following spring during the hearings in which a Senate
committee considered the qualifications of Richard G.
Kleindienst to be Attorney General. This probe of the negotia-
tion process surrounding the ITT case aroused suspicion that
there were some inappropriate reasons for the government's
settlement. Among these was the suggestion that ITT had of-
fered to help finance the 1972 Republican National Convention
in return for the settlement. Another was the Antitrust Divi-
sion's concern that a divestiture of Hartford would cause
"hardship" to ITT, its stockholders and the economy.'
Ralph Nader, who had opposed the approval of the ITT
consent decree, attempted to use these revelations to reopen
the ITT case. His suit suggested that "hardship" was not a le-
gally permissible ground upon which to settle an antitrust suit,
and that the Antitrust Division had violated its duty to dis-
close the reasons for the settlement of the case. Extensive
hearings on the merits of Nader's claim were held. The allega-
tion that ITT had offered to help finance the Republican Con-
vention was found to be completely unjustified.' In addition,
the court determined that the government's reliance on "hard-
ship" as a factor in reaching a settlement carried no implica-
tion of fraud. Nevertheless, in the wake of the unproven allega-
tions regarding the ITT settlement, legislation was introduced
to rectify the defects in the antitrust settlement process.' *
The congressional debate surrounding the introduction of
the Tunney legislation in 1973 indicates concern that public
confidence in the propriety of the antitrust settlement process
was waning. As one Senator stated:
[R]ecent disclosures in connection with the IT antitrust settlement
have again shaken public confidence in our legal system. At a time
when public confidence in our institutions is, according to polls, at
'2 Id. at 604.
M I&
fIT Dividend, supra note 121, at 605.
ITT Dividend, supra note 121, at 606.
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an all-time low, the recent disclosures concerning the ITT case are a
further blow to the already beleaguered Department of Justice.128
The Senate discussions also recognized the importance of
antitrust settlements to the public, a public that is largely
unable to voice its opinions about such settlements:
"[E]nforcement of the antitrust laws may have a very profound
effect on the lives of every citizen of this country."29 In addi-
tion, the bill's sponsor, Senator Tunney, voiced concern over
the political implications that an increasing concentration of
economic power could have, stating: "[Tihe bigger the company,
the greater the leverage it has in Washington .... We are not
yet a corporate state but we may wish to decide whether we
want to be before it happens by default.""'
The above concerns reemphasize the position that Con-
gress intended the Tunney Act to provide the courts with broad
review powers. As a tool of statutory construction, the Congres-
sional Record confirms the plain meaning of the legislation:
The mandate is a highly significant one because it states as a mat-
ter of law that the role of the district court in a consent decree pro-
ceeding is an independent one. The court is not to operate simply as
a rubber stamp, placing an imprimatur upon whatever is placed
before it by the parties. Rather it has an independent duty to assure
itself that entry of the decree will serve the interests of the public
generally. Though this may seem a truism to some, too often in the
past district courts have viewed their roles as simply ministerial in
nature-leaving to the Justice Department the role of determining
the adequacy of the judgment from the public's view."'1
C. Case Law
In making the public interest determination, courts have
employed varying standards of review. Many have been defer-
ential, expressing a reluctance to question the Justice
Department's capabilities in formulating settlements, absent a
showing of bad faith or malfeasance. This trend seems to have
begun with an antitrust case that predated the Tunney Act
and dealt with intervention of parties rather than review of
M 119 CONG. REc. S35,907 (1973) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
129 119 CONG. REC. S3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
119 Id-
131 119 CONG. REC. S31,675 (1972) (emphasis added).
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consent decrees, Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States.'
In Sam Fox, the Supreme Court advocated deference to the
government's position, stating that: "[SIound policy would
strongly lead us to decline appellants' invitation to assess the
wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and ac-
cepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any
claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Govern-
ment in so acting."" Although the Sam Fox decision in-
volved a district court's denial of intervention to private parties
and not specifically consent decrees, the district court in Unit-
ed States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. concluded that
"lower federal courts must follow the guidance of the dictum of
[Sam Fox]." Similarly, the district court in United States v.
National Broadcasting Co. concluded that the Sam Fox policy
of deference should be followed despite evidence that the Tun-
ney Act was specifically designed to prevent judicial rubber
stamping of consent decrees.'
A number of cases, however, demonstrate a more intensive
exercise of judicial review. In United States v. AT&T Co.,"
- 366 U.S. 683 (1961). For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see Scope
of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 165-69.
1 Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 689.
394 F. Supp. 29, 41 (W.D. Mo. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
1 United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127 (CD. Cal.
1978). Criticism of this approach followed. See Michael J. Zimmer & Charles A.
Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and
Employment Discrimination; Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 163, 208, 210 ("[Uintil recently, courts routinely rubber-stamped proposed
consent decrees .. . largely due to doubts about the wisdom of reviewing Justice
Department determinations. The Tunney Act, however, establishes a contrary pub-
lic policy.").
1 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983). AT&T also involved a monopoly of the telecommunications
industry. In that case, however, the consent decree called for the forced breakup of
the defendant telecommunications giant. In United States u. GTE Corp., another
antitrust case, Judge Greene determined that GTE's status was not as dominat-
ing as AT&T's had been and, thus, complete divestiture was not required.
In Maryland v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion
the entry of several consent decrees. In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White, Justice Rehnquist questioned whether the public interest deter-
mination of the Tunney Act is 'within the judicial power." 460 U.S. at 1106
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist suggested that the public interest
review may be a political question that is beyond the competence of the judiciary.
Id. at 1105; see Joseph C. Teitelbaum, The Scope and Constitutionality of Judicial
Review under the Tunney Act: United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.
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despite claiming that a lower standard of review was required,
a district court judge subjected a consent decree to intense ex-
amination. In that case, Judge Harold Greene stated that a
less rigorous review was required because parties would not
otherwise be motivated to consent to judgments. As a conse-
quence of a higher standard of review, the consent decree
would be eliminated as a tool for antitrust enforcement. Judge
Greene reasoned that as long as the proposed settlement falls
within the reaches of acceptability, it should be valid.13
Nevertheless, Judge Greene emphasized that this deferen-
tial standard does not imply that a court must approve a set-
tlement that it feels is inadequate. To do so, he felt, would be
to ignore the clear intent of Congress in passing the Tunney
Act.'38 In making the public interest determination, Judge
Greene emphasized that the court's role was to view the set-
tlement in terms of the basic purposes of antitrust law.'39 He
noted that the Supreme Court had found that in enacting the
Sherman Act, Congress had sought to "preserv[e] free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade."4 ' Thus, the de-
cree must look not only to past violations, but to future ones as
well, and must foreclose the reoccurrence of further antitrust
violations." Judge Greene then carefully evaluated the indi-
vidual terms of the proposed settlement, and conditioned his
approval of the decree on the parties' acceptance of modifica-
tions that satisfied the district court's public interest crite-
ria.142
Two years after AT&T, in United States v. GTE Corp.,
43
Judge Greene again subjected a consent decree to intense judi-
cial review. He emphasized that the court's role is to deter-
mine that each provision of a proposed settlement is in the
public interest, not merely that the settlement as a whole is
Cir. 1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 941 (1996) (arguing that whether the
scope of a particular consent decree is in the public interest is a nonjusticiable
political question).
13 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
138 Id. at 151.
13 Id. at 149.
'o Id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
141 Id.
1.2 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
" 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).
1996] JUDICAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES
reasonable.'" In GTE, the government filed an antitrust ac-
tion challenging the acquisitions by GTE of the telecommunica-
tion companies owned by the Southern Pacific Company, oper-
ators of Sprint long distance. The complaint declared that the
effect of the acquisitions would be to lessen competition in the
telecommunications industry, especially in the areas where
GTE provided local telephone service. On the same day that
the complaint was filed, the parties also filed a consent decree
to settle the case.'
The consent decree in GTE allowed for the acquisition of
Southern Pacific subject to a number of conditions."4 ' In ap-
proving the decree, Judge Greene advocated a lower standard
of review than he had used in the AT&T case because GTE
had a smaller market share than AT&T and was a less concen-
trated company. 47 Despite this call for a less strenuous re-
view, the court conditioned its approval of the settlement on
several modifications of the proposed consent decree."
In United States v. Gillette Co., Judge Bailey Aldrich of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts grant-
ed approval of a proposed consent decree between the govern-
ment and Gillette, and provided one of the clearest indications
that there is judicial uncertainty about the proper role to be
taken by judges in the consent decree process. In Gillette, the
government brought an action charging the defendant with
violating antitrust laws in the dry shaving market. In its com-
plaint, the government called for the complete divestiture of all
the assets of the Braun Company, a German corporation."
The settlement, however, provided for only the divestiture of
Braun's capacity to sell electric shavers in the United
States.'
I" Id. at 740-41.
145 Id.
I" The additions demanded by Judge Greene included: (1) the establishment of
procedural and substantive guidelines to be followed in the event of a violation of
the decree; (2) the elimination of a provision permitting GTE within five years to
provide information services directly;, and (3) a modification to protect competition
in the Hawaii-mainland telecommunications market Id. at 753.
14 I& at 732-35.
141 GTE, 603 F. Supp. at 753.
' 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
150 Id.
" Id,
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In his opinion, Judge Aldrich recognized the difficult bur-
den the court has in making the public interest determination.
He stated that the legislative history of the Tunney Act shows
that Congress "did not intend the court's action to be merely
pro forma, or to be limited by what appears on the sur-
face." 52 Judge Aldrich found it impossible to overlook the cir-
cumstances under which the Tunney Act was passed, implying
a reference to the ITT litigation and public concern that anti-
trust settlements were too secretive. Additionally, he recog-
nized the desire of Congress to impose a check on the govern-
ment's expertise and good faith.5 '
Judge Aldrich also emphasized, however, the need to bal-
ance the above interests with the need to settle antitrust cases
as efficiently as possible. He argued that the Tunney Act's
listing of various procedures short of a comprehensive exami-
nation suggested the requirement that the court make the
determination in the least complicated and least time consum-
ing manner possible, stating, "Just as the parties are compro-
mising, so in its process of weighing the public interest, must
the court."" Recognizing that consent decrees are an impor-
tant enforcement tool because they allow the allocation of re-
sources elsewhere, the court declined to engage in extended
proceedings in making the public interest determination. 5'
Judge Aldrich failed to offer clear reasons for his approval
of the consent decree in Gillette. Rather, he stated generally
that the settlement had met the requirements of the Tunney
Act, the record had been open and extensive, and the govern-
ment had acted in good faith.'56 In seeking to clarify the
court's role in the proceedings, Judge Aldrich emphasized that
it is not the court's duty to determine whether the consent
decree is the best settlement possible for the public. Instead,
the court must determine only whether the settlement is "with-
in the reaches of the public interest."'57 In making this deter-
152 Id. at 715.
163 Id.
15 Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 715.
155 Id.
15 Id. at 715-16.
57 Id. at 716.
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mination, Judge Aldrich suggested that the court must "look at
the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope,
but with an artist's reducing glass.""
In contrast, the decision in United States v. BNS Inc.'
suggests that the Ninth Circuit might agree with Judge
Sporkin's independent inquiry.60 In BNS, the Justice De-
partment challenged the takeover of Koppers by BNS, both of
which are companies that manufacture and sell aggregate rock
in southern California. The complaint by the Justice Depart-
ment claimed that the merger would stifle competition in the
sale of aggregate rock in this market.16" ' In an attempt to re-
sist the takeover, Koppers argued that the Justice Department
should enjoin the entire transaction because it would stifle
competition in southern California as well as other geographic
and product markets. The district court, invoking its review
powers under the Tunney Act, preliminarily enjoined the merg-
er in order to give the court more time to review the effects of
the merger on other markets."G The Ninth Circuit upheld the
decision, implicitly approving the district court's investigation
beyond the complaint to anticompetitive harm not alleged by
the Justice Department.
Much of the case law concerning antitrust settlements fails
to advance conclusively the court's independent role in mak-ing the public interest determination. Instead, the majority of
cases pay great deference to the Justice Department's conclu-
sions." It is unclear why this occurs in light of the plain lan-
guage of the statute, as well as Congress's intent as evidenced
by the Congressional Record. A number of theories for this
anomaly have been proposed. One is that there is a general re-
luctance by the courts to review the discretionary decisions of
'Id.
11 848 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1988).
161 See Garza, supra note 69, at 24.
16 BNS, 848 F.2d at 459.
12 Id. at 458.
16 See, eg., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1981)
('The balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree" must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General"); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) ("[IThe court [is] bound to accept any modification that the Department
reasonably regarded as advancing the public interest"); United States v. Airline
Tariff Publishing Co., No. CIV-A.92-2854, 1993 VWL 95486 (D.D.C. 1993).
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administrative bodies.'" A second theory is that the judiciary
fears that calling too many witnesses to help the court under-
stand the case may unintentionally undermine the agreement
and cause the defendant to withdraw its consent to the settle-
ment." A third explanation for the reluctance is that courts
are aware that "facilitating the settlement of the case" is a
stated objective under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.166 Regardless of the reasons for the courts' hesita-
tion to review consent decrees, the lack of independent evalua-
tion by courts contradicts the intent of the legislature in enact-
ing the Tunney Act.
6 7
In addition to the specific reasons indicated by the legisla-
tive history of the Tunney Act, there are a number of features
inherent in the antitrust settlement process that support the
demand for a thorough and intensive review. 168 First, consent
decrees often set an example for the rest of the implicated
industry. 69 Others in the affected industry tend to conform to
a decree's provisions even though it is not specifically required
of them.7 ° Second, consent decrees may significantly hamper
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws.' This is largely
because consent decrees do not have prima facie effect,..
thereby practically eliminating the possibility that a private
claimant will succeed in a treble damage action against a cor-
porate defendant with deeper pockets.' Finally, because a
16 ITT Dividend, supra note 121, at 610.
' ITT Dividend, supra note 121, at 610.
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. In Owen Fiss's Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984), Professor Fiss argues that settlements are, at best, "a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised." Id. at
1075. Adjudication, unlike settlements, supplies us with rules and precedents and
guides future behavior. Furthermore, adjudication has a unique purpose in that it
is a reasoned elaboration and expression of societal values. For a discussion of
Owen Fiss's article, see David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995).
16 See supra Section IV.B.
168 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 163-65.
1 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 163-65.
170 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 163 ("[Clonsent decrees often
create a follow-the-leader' effect in a particular industry, effectively setting the
standard of conduct for the entire industry.").
171 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 163.
1 Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
173 Due to the protracted and expensive nature of antitrust litigation, few pri-
vate plaintiffs are able to support the expense of litigating against corporate defen-
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consent decree is often the result of a long and expensive in-
vestigation by the government, "it is both logical and neces-
sary that the end result be as carefully considered as possi-
ble."7 4
D. Separation of Powers
On appeal, Microsoft claimed that Judge Sporkin's broad
reading of the Tunney Act constituted an overstepping by the
judiciary into the prosecutorial discretion of the executive
branch. 75 The Framers of the United States Constitution
purposely provided for allocation of national authority among
the legislative, executive and judicial branches. That desire for
separation is evidenced by the treatment of each branch in
Articles I, H and III of the Constitution. However, this separa-
tion was not intended to be airtight.'76 A system of checks
and balances was deliberately built into the governmental
structure to ensure against excessive concentrations of pow-
er."' In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services," the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that the Constitution contem-
dants and their deep pockets. See 119 CONG. REC. S3451 (1973) (iFlew private
plaintiffs are able to sustain a case in the absence of parallel litigation by the
Justice Department.") (statement of Sen. Tunney).
... Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 34 n.78 (quoting 119 CONG. REC.
S3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney)).
' Motion for Expedited Consideration and for Briefing Schedule, Microsoft I,
159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 94-1564), reu'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
In this motion, Microsoft joined the Motion for Expedited Consideration and for
Briefing Schedule filed by the United States on the same day, February 16, 1995.
The motion made by the United States sets forth the reasons for the appeal of
Judge Sporkin's rejection of the proposed consent decree, namely that Judge
Sporkin misconstrued the permissible scope of judicial review under the Tunney
Act.
176 THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
' THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). The text
reads: "To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice
the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in
the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriv-
ing the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places." Id. at 335-36 (Sherman F. Mitchell ed., 1937) (emphasis added). For sup-
porting cases, see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
178 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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plates a complete division of authority among the three
branches.'79 Instead, the Supreme Court supports a "more
pragmatic, flexible approach.... .18
Similarly, Judge Sporkin's exercise of the provisions of
the Tunney Act is indicative of the flexibility necessary to
provide a system of checks and balances. It is indisputable that
a key element of the executive branch's constitutional power
is the power to enforce the law,'' which includes the power
to investigate and prosecute violations of the law. However,
the Supreme Court appears willing to allow certain in-
fringements upon that power. For example, the statute in
question in Morrison v. Olson required the Attorney General to
apply to a special federal court for a special prosecutor to in-
vestigate allegations of wrongdoing by executive branch mem-
bers.8 2 Once appointed, the special prosecutor could be re-
moved by the Attorney General only under very limited cir-
cumstances. Three former government officials who were sub-
poenaed to testify before a grand jury brought suit challenging
the authority of the special prosecutor. The Supreme Court
decided that the law did not unconstitutionally usurp executive
179 Id. In Nixon, the Court rejected a separation of powers constitutional chal-
lenge to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, enact-
ed by Congress to ensure custody of documents and tape recordings created during
the tenure of former President Richard Nixon.
1" Id. at 442. Similarly, in a more recent case, Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized that a "twilight area" exists where
the powers of the three branches are mixed. Id. at 386.
Legal scholars and the Supreme Court have long attempted to make sense of
the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 574 (1954) (refusing to implement the President's order to seize
steel mills because Congress, and not the President, is vested with the lawmaking
function); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (limiting the President's power to
remove members of the FTC). It is, admittedly, an area of contested constitutional
meaning. Nevertheless, a complete discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a more comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Jonathan
L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 175 (1990); Mathew James Tanielian, Separation of Pow.
ers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961
(1995); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681
(1996).
'8' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
12 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Ironically, Judge Silberman, who reversed Judge
Sporkin in Microsoft II claiming that there had been a separation of powers viola-
tion, was himself reversed in Morrison by the Supreme Court, which determined
that Judge Silberman's finding of a separation of powers violation was unfounded.
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power because the infringement was slight and did not disrupt
the proper balance between the coordinate branches of the gov-
ernment."8 Similarly, even if, arguendo, the rejection of the
Microsoft settlement slightly infringed upon the executive
branch's constitutionally assigned functions, namely prosecut-
ing antitrust cases, this intrusion is justified by the need to
ensure the propriety surrounding government settlements with
large and wealthy corporations.'
Although the Supreme Court's modern separation of pow-
ers jurisprudence has been somewhat inconsistent,"m Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Public Citizen v. Depar!ment of
Justice' attempts to set forth the standard of review for cases
in which a separation of powers violation has been asserted. A
balancing approach is used by the Court to determine whether
the constitutional powers of one of the three branches has been
infringed. 87 In evaluating the alleged infringement of the
President's constitutional powers in Public Citizen, Justice
Kennedy asserted that the primary focus is whether the Presi-
dent has been prevented "from accomplishing [his] constitu-
tionally assigned functions.""S If infringement is found, the
next step for the Court is to determine whether "the extent of
the intrusion on the President's powers 'is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
authority of Congress."" Justice Kennedy noted that the
Court was especially likely to allow the alleged infringement if
the power at issue was not explicitly assigned to a branch by
the language of the Constitution, but merely thought to be
within the general grant to the executive branch."'
183 Id at 694-96.
18 See supra Section IV.B.
18 See supra note 180.
18 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
J., concurring).
"8 Id at 484.
1 Id. (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
18 Id
183 Id at 485. In contemplating the balancing test used by the Supreme Court
in separation of powers cases, Justice Kennedy noted that "[wlhere a power has
been committed to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the Con-
stitution, the balance already has been struck by the Constitution itself.7 Id. at
486.
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Utilizing the balancing test set forth by Justice Kennedy,
Judge Sporkin's rejection of the MVicrosoft consent decree falls
within the realm of constitutionality because such judicial
intervention does not interfere with the executive branch's
constitutionally assigned power to enforce the law. Judicial
intervention in settlements has long been practiced and, in
fact, is promoted explicitly in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.19' Rule 16 gives the court discretion in promoting the
settlement of cases, stating: "In any action, the court may in
its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any un-
represented parties to appear before it for a conference and
conferences before trial for such purposes as facilitating the
settlement of the case."192
Furthermore, the argument for deference made by the
Justice Department and Microsoft fails to consider the courts'
inherent equitable power to reject the entry of judgments that
contravene the public interest.193 Although negotiations in-
volve administrative decisions by the government, a court's
entry of a consent decree is a judicial act which is both consti-
tutional' 4 and statutory'95 in nature.'96 Thus, an inten-
sive review of a consent decree by a district court may be sup-
ported apart from the Tunney Act.197 The court's intrinsic
191 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
19 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 168-69; see United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). In Swift, a case decided long before the passage
of the Tunney Act which dealt with the modification of a continuing decree, the
Supreme Court found that a court's power to modify the decree, even if not ex-
pressly reserved in the decree, is inherent, stating: "All the parties to the consent
decree concede the jurisdiction of the court to change it." Id. at 115.
19 The Constitution grants courts the power to decide "[clases, in ... Equity,
arising under the laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
" Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and Section 15 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25, direct the court "in equity to prevent and restrain .. .viola-
tions of the antitrust laws."
* Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 168.
" Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 168.
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equitable power "over [its] own process[ ], to prevent abuse, op-
pression and injustice" negates the demand for deference to
the Justice Department's wisdom.'
CONCLUSION
The language of the Tunney Act, case law and legislative
history support Judge Sporkin's pragmatic view of the
judiciary's role in reviewing consent decrees in antitrust cases.
Despite the expertise and the negotiating skill of the Justice
Department attorneys, they are neither infallible nor omni-
scient.' The Tunney Act thus operates as a check against
errors made by the Justice Department, for "[in approving a
particular decree, the Justice Department attorneys may over-
look certain issues, ignore certain concerns, or misunderstand
certain facts."2"' Indeed, the continuing aggressiveness of
Microsoft's practices has left grave questions unanswered
about the efficacy of the government's settlement.'
Natalie L. Krodel
Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 161 --57 (quoting Antitrust Pro-
cedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S.782 and S.1088 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1973)).
Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 169.
20 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 162.
201 Scope of Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 177 n.57 (quoting CONG. REC.
31,675 (1972)).
2M See supra note 3.
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